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help orient classical realists in their efforts to contribute
to the discussion about ethics and animals.
The essay to which I am referring is "Animal
Liberation: A Triangular Affair."l The title betrays the
primary purpose of the piece. Callicott argues that the
debate over the liberation and rights of animals is not a
bipolar one, as has often been maintained, but is, rather,
three-sided. The three competing positions are, as
Callicott distinguishes them, ethical or moral humanism,
humane moralism, and environmental ethics. The
ethical humanists argue that nonhuman animals are not
worthy ofbeing accorded moral standing because "Only
human beings are rational, or capable of having
interests, or possess 'self'-awareness, or have linguistic
abilities or can represent the future .... "2 This does not
necessarily mean that animals may be treated
inhumanely. Rather, animals may be treated as "means"
and need not be treated as persons or ends in themselves.
The humane moralists, on the other hand, argue
against the ethical or moral humanists, claiming that
even in lieu of possessing the aforesaid qualities that
serve to constitute personhood, animals are "sentient"
beings. Since animals possess "sensibility," it is argued
that they suffer pain and that" ...we are morally obliged
to consider their suffering as much an evil to be minimized
by conscientious moral agents as human suffering."3
While the ethical humanists and the humane moralists
surely differ as to whether animals are beings who can

The occasion for this paper was an invitation from
organizers of the Society for Classical Realism to
participate in a special session, at the American
Philosophical Association Central Division Conference,
of the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals.
Implicit in this invitation was the idea that those
interested in classical realism, of which I am one, might
make some contribution to the debate about the value
of animals and, thereby, to the broader discussion of
our actual obligations to the other-than-human aspects
of nature. In this short essay I will offer some
preliminary reflections on the philosophical foundations
of the discussion of ethics and animals and conclude
that classical realism as a philosophical style in fact
lends itself to such foundational considerations.
In my mind, not only can classical realists contribute
positively to this important debate, but there is one
particularly scholarly line of argument in this complex
discussion that is especially compatible with the
classical realist philosophical style. Moreover, J. Baird
Callicott leaves a very rich clue for classical realists, in
one of his well-known essays on environmental ethics.
I will try to demonstrate shortly that this clue could
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legitimately have moral consideration extended to them,
Callicott argues that they are similar in important ways.
He argues that adherents to both of these theoretical
approaches locate moral value in "individuals" (whether
human or human and animal). Both approaches extend
moral consideration to some individuals and exclude
others. In the end Callicott argues that both positions
are atomistic, reductive, and distributive.
As distinguished from ethical humanism and
humane moralism, Callicott defines environmental
ethics as a "holistic or collective," and therefore not
atomistic or reductive, theoretical approach to the
valuation of animals. Indeed, this environmental ethic
is called "ethical holism" because it".. .locates ultimate
value in the [whole] 'biotic community' .....4 It is in
fact the greatest good, Le., the summum bonum, of the
whole ecosystem, or the natural community, which
" ...serves as a standard for the assessment of the relative
value and relative ordering of its constitutive parts and
therefore provides a means for adjudicating the often
mutally contradictory demandS of the parts considered
separately for 'equal' consideration."s
Animals, as only one of the constitutive groups
which make up the biotic community, would have their
value determined, like the other parts, relative to the
practical impact that such a valuation would have on
the other natural entities (e.g., plants, minerals, waters,
soils, etc.). More importantly, the value accorded to
animals would be assigned in lightof the projected effect
on the "common good" or the ".. .integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic community... '>6 Callicott's
environmental ethic is "holistic" and not reductive
because it does not arise out of a reduction to some
privileged individual(s) which serves as the standard
for moral consideration. Rather, moral consideration
is born of a comprehensive valuation of the biotic
community as such.
Callicott's inspiration for this holistic environmental
ethic is, of course, AIdo Leopold and his "land ethic."
In fact he argues that Leopold's land ethic is a modem
classic and can be treated as "the standard example,
the paradigm case...of what an environmental ethic
is."? He suggests that while he will employ Leopold's
land ethic as something of an exemplar type in his
effort clearly to distinguish environmental ethics from
animal liberation and animal rights-based ethical
theories, he does not hold that all environmental ethical
systems must conform to Leopold's to be termed
"environmental ethics."
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On his way to the claim that "holism" is the most
"creative, interesting and practical" theory among the
three in question, Callicott gives a brief but very nice
summary of Leopold's land ethic. There is one
especially noteworthy moment in this summary and
analysis of Leopold's ethic. It is the point at which
Callicott attempts to explicate the core of the land ethic
by comparing it to Plato's moral and social philosophy.
It is in this comparison that we can discern a "clue" as
to the direction that classical realist approaches to the
valuation of animals might take. His suggestion is
that Plato's ethic is holistic in a very similar way to
that holism that lies at the heart ofLeopold's land ethic.
Callicott's comparison of Plato's position to that of
Leopold is captured in the following passage:
From the ecological perspective, according to
Leopold as I have pointed out, land is like an
organic body or like a human society. According
to Plato, body, soul and society have similar
structures and corresponding virtues. The
goodness ofeach is a function ofits structure or
organization and the relative value of the parts
or constituents of each is calculated according
to the contribution made to the integrity, stability
and beauty of each whole. s
Callicott goes on to exploit this notion that the order
and goodness of the whole is the standard for the
function and the value of the parts. He cites several
examples of how this principle was employed in
Plato's Republic.
The good of the ideal state, indeed the possibility of
justice and happiness in that state, depended on the
assignment of function and value in all arts and sciences,
in virtually all human ambition, in such a way that the
well-being of the community or the city as a whole was
preserved. Of course, in the Republic the discussion of
the just, well-ordered city occurs first, in part, to make
way for the claim that a soul is comparable to a city
and, as equally well-ordered, would be both just and
happy. The parts of the soul, Le., reason, spirit, and
desire, having different functions and capacities for
excellence or virtue, needed to be ordered in such a way
that there occurred a harmony. This harmony was
understood as the primary condition necessary for a
morally virtuous life. This balance, stability, and beauty
of the order of soul and city, Callicott suggests, is nicely
mirrored in Leopold's land ethic.
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But Calljcott does not plumb the comparison of
Leopold and Plato nearly enough. First, scholarship
on the Republic has shown that "lifting" Plato's political
philosophy, for example, out of this dialogue is a difficult enterprise at best9 Second, and more importantly,
the comparison between Plato and Leopold remains at
the surface. He invokes Plato's ethics and politics, and
even in the examples of the subordination of parts to
whole that he cites from the Republic, Callicott doesn't
appreciate the support for these claims he might have
gotten by unearthing the metaphysical and ontological
foundations of Plato's political philosophy and value
theory. 10 It is with a fuller appreciation of these
metaphysical underpinnings that classical realists will
begin to discern a true compatibility between holistic
environmental ethical systems like those ofLeopold and
Callicott and systematic, metaphysical classical realist
philosophies, like that of Plato.
In the remainder of this essay I'll try to make this last
claim more clearand compelling. However, I would like
to place the same qualification on my remarks about the
use ofPlato's thoughts that Callicott places on his, at the
beginning of the essay, "Animal Liberation: ATriangular
Affair," regarding his discussion of Leopold Recall,
. Callicott said that while "Aldo Leopold.. .is universally
recognized as the father or founding genius of recent
environmental ethics,"l1 he only intended to useLeopold's
land ethic as a "paradigm" or the exemplary type of the
holistic environmental ethic he was about to describe.
It seems to me that Plato has been viewed as
something of a "father" or founding genius of classical
realism. 12 And yet I am making no claim that all
classical realist forays into the battle over the value of
animals need be Platonic. I am claiming only that
perhaps by using Plato's philosophy as an exemplar of
classical realism we can find a uniquely classical realist
way into the debate about ethics and animals.
Let me return now to my earlier claim that Callicott,
while leaving a clue for classical realists, perhaps dido't
exploit his comparison between Leopold and Plato
enoughP Callicott says that "Plato...never develops
anything faintly resembling an environmental ethic.
Plato never reached an ecological view of living
nature."14 He follows this remark with the claim that
Plato was primarily, "... if not exclusively, concerned
with moral problems involving individual human beings
in a political context. .. "15 It seems to me that the first
of these remarks by Callicott is overstated and the
second is quite wrong.
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While it is perhaps true that we don't have a dialogue
or even a body of texts which bear out a Platonic
environmental ethic, there are numbers of places, most
especially in the Republic, the dialogue to which
Callicott refers most, where interesting connections can
be made between some of the key notions in Callicott's
holistic environmental ethics and Plato's philosophy.
A brief discussion of just some of these connections
will demonstrate both the richness ofCallicott's original
comparison of Leopold and Plato and his failure to see
beneath the social and political level of the comparison
to its metaphysical foundation.
At the center of the holism of Callicott and Leopold
is the notion that the biotic community has a summum
bonum, a common, holistic good. This summum bonum
is defined by Callicott, in this essay, in terms of
"stability, integrity and beauty."16 The holistic
ecological perspective sees the value of the biotic
community as the standard for the value of its members.
This good is one which, as stable, beautiful and unified
or integral, is of a certain "order." In fact Callicott's
discussion of holism is pervaded by the notion that the
goal of environmental ethics is to discern the "order"
of the biotic community and to assign value and to
prescribe legitimate use of the constituents of the
community in a way that contributes to the unity,
harmony and balance of the eco-system.
As we know, Plato makes similar kinds of claims
about the good of souls and cities. Justice is in fact
defined several times in the Republic as the harmony
or appropriate order among the parts of the whole,
whether in cities or in soulsP We must remember,
however, that for Plato, especially in the Republic,
justice is "natural" to us. In fact, the argument about
the origin and nature of justice is framed against a
backdrop of claims by some people that being just is
"against our nature."18
Justice in the soul is understood by Plato to be
"natural" in the same way that the "natural" order of
the body is said to be health. So, the natural good, order
and excellence of the soul is justice. In relation to city
and soul Plato ties together, under the umbrella of
justice, goodness, integrity or unity, stability or
harmony, and ultimately beauty, as he refers often to
the "fine" or beautiful nature of the well-ordered soul.
Yet even more interesting is the fact that Plato uses
the word phusis and various forms of it to indicate the
nature of things, or what he thinks is "natural." The
Greek word phusis itself referred to the natural or
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appropriate order, constitution or structure of a person
or thing.t 9 For a thing to have a "nature" was for it to
have an appropriate order, an essential arrangement of
the parts in the whole.
For Plato the stability, beauty, and integrity of the
ideal or excellent soul or virtuous and ideal city, i.e.,
the appropriate order and good of each, was "natural."
Even the universe for him was a kosmos or an "order"
and was so "by nature."
While Callicott may have been correct in saying that
Plato never developed a systematic environmental ethic,
it seems clear thatby tying together the idea of the phusis
or the nature of things with their inherent "order" or
structure, Plato laid the "metaphysical groundwork" for
those who would take this clue as foundational to
arguments that would maintain that the natural world
was to be valued as a unity, an order, a whole.
It must also be mentioned that Callicott is, ofcourse,
correct in saying that the body, soul, society and cosmos
are the "wholes" of Plato's universe.20 TItey are not,
however, the only, or pemaps the most important ones. I
am thinking about the wholes to beat all wholes, i.e., the
transcendent ideas or forms. In Book X of the Republic,
we learn that these essences are "in nature" produced by
god. They were begotten by god as "one" by nature.
The natural order, and thus reality itself, is
constituted by the forms. It is toward this more
comprehensive sense of "the natural" as "the orderly"
or "the whole" that ecological holisms like those of
Leopold and Callicott could turn. The real consists in
the orderly. Thus the stability, integrity, and beauty of
Callicott's biotic community would be for Plato an
imitation of the more cosmic harmony, beauty and unity
of the intelligible realm of ideas, of reality itself. 21
This essay has been an attempt to provide classical
realists with one possible avenue by way of which they
may contribute to the ethics and animals debate. If
Plato's classical realism is taken as an example, it would
seem that holistic or environmental ethical approaches
to establishing the value of animals, as opposed to the
ethical humanist and the humane moralist approaches,
would prove most fruitful.
The focus ofsuch holistic approaches on unity, on the
good of the whole, and on more ultimate, largely
transcendentprinciples like stability, beauty, and integrity,
would be most complemented by classical realist
philosophies which were founded on similar ultimate
notions which imply an understanding of nature as an
order and a unity. The whole idea of approaching
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ecology22 in general, and the valuation of animals in
particular, from a metaphysical, foundational perspective
on the relationship between the whole and its parts, the
one and the many, would provide for rich insight and for
a unique contribution to the valuation of animals debate.

Notes
1 I will be quoting from the version of this essay which
appeared in People, Penguins and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues
in Environmental Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 184·203. The essay was
originally printed in Environmmtal Ethics, 2, no. 4, (Winter
1980): pp. 311-338.
2 Ibid., p. 186. It should be mentioned thatCallicott expends
considerable effort identifying individual theorists with one of
the three major positions he defines. L of course, will not be
expending efforts in this direction, because the point of this
present essay is not to parse and/or categorize theories, but to
determine a general theoretical direction which would be
suggestive or fruitful for classical realists to follow.
3 Ibid.,

p. 187.

4 Ibid.,

p. 197.

S Ibid.,

p. 190.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.,

p. 184.

8 Ibid.,

p. 192.

9 For instance, it is unclear to what extent, if any, Plato
intended the ideal city of the Republic to be an actual "blueprint" for society. More to the point, the examples that
Callicott cites concerning infanticide, the mating ritual and
the destruction of the family alone need to be interpreted
contextually.
10 Callicott does

cite as well Plato's Gorgias, 503d-507a,

(p. 202, Note 33). However, the discussion of the relationship
of "whole to parts" is again fundamentally ethical or social/
political. A major concern in this Platonic dialogue is, of
course, rhetoric.
11

Callicott, p. 184.

12 Plato is a classical realist, in part, because he argued for
the existence of the "ideas" or the "forms," He claimed that
the forms were separate, intelligible beings that existed
independently of the mental or linguistic activities of human
beings. These forms, e.g., justice, beauty, courage, etc., were
considered by him to be the ultimate realities, the ground of
all claims to knowledge and truth.
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13 It must be said that Callicott's project, in his essay, and
mine in this present paper are quite different. I am in no way
arguing that his "holism" needs a classical realist defense.

14 Callicott,

20 See
21

Callicott, p. 202.

See Republic, 596 b-e.

22 Plato so often uses "health" as a metaphorical way of
talking about order and nature or what is "natural." (In
footnote 25, p. 201, Callicott notes that toward the end of
"The Land Ethic," Leopold himself discusses "land health.")
Environmental holists and/or ecologists could be encouraged
to "push" such metaphors so as to uncover the metaphysical
grounds of their own claims. Callicott is quite right to point
out that "Ecology makes it possible to see land as a unified
system of integrally related parts ... [as a] whole
(p. 189).
He adds that ecological science can do this " without the
least hint of mysticism or ineffability" (ibid.). However,
metaphysics may provide amore all-encompassing conceptual
framework from within which to articulate and defend
environmental holism and the inherent value of nature and
natural entities, including animals.

p. 202, note 37.

15 Ibid.
16

0/Animals

See p. 190, for example.

17 See Plato, The Republic ofPlato, Allan Bloom. Trms.
with notes and Interpretive Essay (New York: Basic Books
Inc., 1968): 435b-c and 443a-e.
18 See the "Story of Gyges," in Republic II, 359b&ff. One
point of this tale is that humans, "by nature," are unjust.

19 See listing of phusis in Liddell and Scott's GreekEnglish
Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

Let them remember,
God of all Life,
What it was like in the jungles of Vietnam,
To be stalked by silent killers,
To see their friends strung up and pierced by hidden booby traps,
Deprived of any final dignity.
Let them feel once again their sorrow
For life cut off in its prime,
For friendships ended by strangers with their own agendas,
Dealers in impersonal death.
Let them relive their horror
At seeing the chopped up bodies of their buddies
Stuffed into plastic bags;
Let them remember their secret longings
For a world
With no killing.

Betty Jahn
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